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CORPORATIONS-NATURE OF STATUTORY LIABILITIES IMPOSED
ON OFFICERS AND STOCKHOLDERS.-Parallel with the growth of
modern corporations has come increased legislation guiding and
controlling corporate conduct for the public protection. Many of
these enactments have taken the form of liabilities imposed on
officers and stockholders for corporate debts in favor of creditors,
over and beyond the liabilities existing at common law. Apart
from constitutional provisions' or statutes, a stockholder could be
held only to the extent of his unpaid subscriptions,' and an officer
'The Minnesota Constitution, Art. io, par 3, provides a stockholders'
liability to the amount of stock held, with certain exceptions.
22 Morawetz, Priv. Corp., 2d Ed.. sec. 86g; note 3 A. S. R. 834.
NOTES
was not liable except as an agent.' An important and frequently
arising question is whether these statutory liabilities are by nature
penal, contractual, or otherwise. Courts agree that the definite
and fixed statutory liability of a stockholder for debts of an in-
solvent corporation, not contingent on some breach of duty, is
contractual by nature," on the theory that it is a liability knowingly
undertaken by the stockholder when he voluntarily subscribes for
stock; and that he impliedly agrees with the corporation creditors
to perform the obligations imposed on stockholders by the consti-
tution and the laws then in force.
With regard to a second class of statutes, namely those which
impose a personal liability, usually unlimited, upon officers and
sometimes stockholders for official neglect or breach of statutory
duty, the decisions are not in harmony.' A majority of the courts
has considered this liability to be strictly penal, on the ground
that it is purely a statutory punishment for the violation of a law
created for the public benefit, and the fact that a remedy is afforded
private persons is indirect and incidental. One jurisdiction holds
that only the liability imposed for a breach of a prohibitive statute
is penal, and that the liability under a permissive statute, that is,
one which merely imposes liability if certain things are or are not
done, is contractual.' The more recent authorities, however, have
adopted what is believed to be a better and more liberal view of this
class of statutes, namely, that they are penal only in part and are
remedial with regard to creditors,' since the duty is to the creditors
'Mitchell v. Hotchkiss, (i88o) 48 Conn. 9, 40 Am. Rep. 146; note 48
A. S. R. 916.
'Flash v. Connecticut, (1883) 109 U. S. 371, 3 S. C. R. 263, 27 L. Ed.
966; Howarth v. Lombard, (i9oo) 175 Mass. 570, 56 N. E. 888, 49 L. R.
A. 3oi; Bernheimer v. Converse, (1907) 2o6 U. S. 516, 27 S. C. R. 755,
51 L. Ed. i63; I Page, Contracts, 2d Ed., sec. 66, n. 5; I Cook, Corpora-
tions, 6th Ed., sec. 223, p. 585.
'The distinction between the two classes of statutes indicated is clearly
pointed out in Adler v. Baker-Dodge Theatre Co., (Ia. 1921) 18i N. W.
254;For failure to publish certain notices and reports required by statute,
Cable v. McCuTie, (i858) 26 Mo. 371, 72 Am. Dec. 214; Halsey v. Mc-
Lean, (1866) 12 Allen (Mass.) 438, 9o Am. Dec. 157 and note; Adler v.
Baker-Dodge Theatre Co., (Ia. 1921) 181 N. W. 254; for contracting
excessive debts, First National Bank of Plymouth v. Price, (1870) 33 Md.
487, 3 Am. Rep. 204; notes 37 A. S. R. 68 and 96 A. S. R. 989; 3 Thomp-
son, Corporations, sec. 4164; 2 Morawetz, Priv. Corp., 2d Ed., sec. 907.
'Diversey v. Smith, (1882) 103 Ill. 378, 42 Am- Rep. 14, cited in Vestal
Co. v. Robertson, (917) 277 Ill. 425, 115 N. E. 629.
'Machinery Co. v. Smith, (1912) 87 Kan. 331, 124 Pac. 414, 41 L. R. A.(N.S.) 379 and note, 3o Ann. Cas. 243 and note; Credit Men's Co. v.
Vickery, (1916) 62 Colo. 214, 161 Pac. 297; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
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and not to the public, the liability in many instances is not for an
arbitrary fixed amount, and the remedy is private and civil. This
doctrine was first asserted by the United States Supreme Court
in Huntington v. Attrill,' which held that these statutes are not
penal in the international sense, i. e., with respect to extraterri-
torial enforcement, though they may be considered penal for other
purposes."0 Strengthened by this decision, many of the recent
cases have drawn away from the former doctrine holding the
statutory liabilities penal, and have taken the position long since
assumed by the Georgia court that these liabilities are not pexial,
but are more in the nature of contractual,' or purely remedial
statutory obligations,'" since primarily the legislative intent was to
provide a remedy rather than to punish. This view is set forth in
Parks Shellac Company v. Harris,' a recent Massachusetts case,
in which the court held that the liability of corporation officers
under a Massachusetts statute for knowingly making false reports
is not penal and so cannot be governed by the penal statute of
limitations, on the ground that "the liability is not based on a public
wrong but protects private rights . . . and is created for the
creditors' benefit only; that since the creditor had a right to rely
upon it when the debt was created, it constituted an implied term
of every contract between the corporation and its creditors."
A conception of the effects of holding these liabilities .entirely
penal, penal in part only, or not at all penal can best be obtained
from an examination of the results of each view. 1. Penal
statutes cannot be enforced extra-territorially because the penal
laws of one state are not recognized in another.' But a contrac-
Crowell, (1917) 245 Fed. 668; 3 Thompson, Corporations, sec. 4166; 2
Morawetz, Priv. Corp., 2d Ed., sec. 9o8; and 3 Clark and Marshall, Priv.
Corp., sec. 833, P. 2675.
"(1892) 146 U. S. 657, 13 S. C. R. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123.
"The court says, p. 676, "As the statute imposes a burdensome liability
on the officers, it may well be considered penal, in the sense that it
should be strictly construed. But as it gives a-civil remedy, at the private
suit of the creditor only, and measured by the amount of his debt, it is as
to him clearly remedial. We can see no just ground for'holding such a
statute to be a penal law, in the sense that it cannot be enforced in a
foreign state or country."
'Farr v. Briggs' Estate, (igoo) 72 Vt. 225, 47 Atl. 793, 82 A. S. R. 930.
"Neal v. Moultrie, .(852) 12 Ga. 1O4; Nebraska National Bank v.
Walsh, (igoo) 68 Ark. 433, 59 S. W. 952, 82 A. S. R. 3o; see also Com-
mercial National Bank v. Kirk, (19og) 222 Pa. St. 567, 71 Atl. 1085, 128
A. S. R. 823.
"(Mass. i921) 129 N. E. 617.
"Halsey v. McLean, (I866) 12 Allen (Mass.) 438, go Am. Dec. 157 and
NOTES
tual or remedial liability may be so enforced,' and a judgment
based thereon must be recognized in a foreign state because of
the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution."
Liabilities considered contractual or penal in part only are en-
forceable extra-territorially on the ground that only those liabili-
ties whicl are entirely penal, their sole purpose being to punish for
a public wrong, are denied recognition in a foreign state." 2
Many states have a shorter statute of limitations for penalties than
for contractual or remedial actions. Liabilities considered penal
only in part are generally held penal for this purpose."' 3. If a
statutory liability is penal the legislature may repeal the statute at
any time before an action is brought thereon and judgment ren-
dered' If a contractual liability, it cannot be taken away by legis-
lative action, because the obligations of a contract cannot be so im-
paired." 4. A penal liability does not survive in case of death,
while a contractual liability survives to the personal representa-
tive.' 5. Lastly, penal statutes are more strictly construed than
contractual or remedial ones." Those penal only in part are held
to a strict construction."
note; First National Bank of Plymouth v. Price, (187o) 33 Md. 487, 3 Am.
Rep. 204.
'Whitman v. Oxford National Bank, (igoo) 176 U. S. 559, 20 S. C. R.
477, 44 L. Ed. 587. But see Marshall v. Sherman, (1895) 148 N. Y. 9, 42
N. E. 419, 34 L. R. A. 757, 5I A. S. R 654.
"Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 13 S. C. R. 224, 36 L. Ed.
1123. See notes 34 L. R. A. 737 and 33 L. R. A. (N.S.) 895.
'Machinery Co. v. Smith, (1912) 87 Kan. 331, 124 Pac. 414, 41 L. R.
A. (N.S.) 379 and note, 3o Ann. Gas. 243 and note; 72 Cent. Law Journal
245.
";State Savings Bank v. Johnson, (1896) 18 Mont. 44o, 45 Pac. 662, 33
L. R. A. 552, 56 A. S. R. 59I; i Cook, Corporations, 6th Ed., sec. 223, p.
588. See, however, Nebraska National Bank v. Walsh, (igoo) 68 Ark.
433, 59 S. W. 952, 82 A. S. R. 3o. The case of Merchant's National
Bank v. Northwestern, etc., Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 349, 51 N. W. 117,
terms the liability penal in this connection, but is asserted to be overruled
in Flowers v. Bartlett, (i896) 66 Minn. 213, 216, 68 N. W. 976, where" the
court broadly states that the statutory liability "is not in any proper sense"
a penalty."
"Gregory v. German Bank, (1877) 3 Colo. 332, 25 Am. Rep. 76o; see
also Globe Publishing Co. v. State Bank of Nebraska, .(894) 41 Neb. 175,
59 N. W. 683, 27 L. R. A. 854; Adler v. Baker-Dodge Theatre Co., (Ia.
i92i) i8I N. W. 254, effect of a curative act.
"See Bemheimer v. Converse, (907) 2o6 U. S. 516, 27 S. C. R. 755, 51
L. Ed. 1163. But note Moss v. Smith, (i916) 171 Cal. 777, 155 Pac. go.
"Mitchell v. Hotchkiss, (i88o) 48 Conn. 9, 4o Am. Rep. 146; 3 Thomp-
son, Corporations, sec. 4169; note 3 A. S. R. 869.
"Cable v. McCune, (1858) 26 Mo. 371, 72 Am. Dec. 214.
"See Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 676, 13 S. C. R. 224,
36 L. Ed. 1123.
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The divergence of the courts in determining the nature of
officers' and stockholders' liabilities may be due in a degree to the
effect of the language of the respective statutes, as expressing the
legislative intent. However, though the weight of authority, as
previously stated, considers the liability imposed by the class of
statutes under consideration to be penal by nature, recent decisions
evidence a tendency to abandon the strict application of the penal
theory in favor of the more liberal interpretation that the statutes
are remedial or contractual.
BANKRUPTCY-EXEMPTION OF INSURANCE POLIcIEs ALLOW-
ED BY STATE LA.-Section 70-a (5) of the Bankruptcy Act
vests in the trustee property which the bankrupt might by any
means have transferred or which was subject to judicial levy and
sale, with the proviso "That when any bankrupt shall have any
insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to
himself, his estate, or personal representatives," he may pay its
cash surrender value to the trustee and continue to hold such
policy "free from the claims of creditors."' Section 6 provides
the act shall not affect exemptions allowed by state laws.- These
two sections have caused much litigation, and various interpreta-
tions have been placed upon them by the lower federal courts.
The Supreme Court has finally set at rest certain points. 1. Where
there is no local exemption statute, all the life and endowment
policies of the bankrupt, whether payable to the bankrupt, his
estate or representatives or to any other person, pass to the trus-
tee, provided there was power in the bankrupt to obtain the cash
surrender value.' 2. The power of the insured to change the bene-
ficiary and thus obtain the cash surrender value of the policy by
its terms payable to another is an asset which will pass to the
trustee.' 3. The interest of the. trustee extends only to the cash
surrender value at the time of bankruptcy.' 4. The "cash sur-
render value" embraces not only policies which by their terms so
provide, but also policies having such value by the practice or con-
13o Stat. 565, Chap. 541, sec. 7o ;'U. S. Comp. Stat. 1918, sec. 9654a (5).
'3o Stat. 548, chap. 541, sec. 6; U. S. Comp. Stat. 1918, sec. 9590.
'Cohen v. Samnuels, (97) 245 U. S. 50, 38 S. C. R. 36, 62 L. Ed. 143.
'Cohen v. Samuels, (1917) 245 U. S. 50, 38 S. C. R. 36, 62 L. Ed.
143; Cohn v. Malone, (igig) 248 U. S. 45o, 39 S. C. R. 141, 63 L. Ed. 352.
SBurlinghaim v. Crouse, (i913) 228 U. S. 459, 473, 33 S. C. R. 564, 57
L. Ed. 92o.
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cession of the company issuing them. 5. Policies which are ex-
empt by state law do not pass to the trustee, because of section 6
of the Bankruptcy Act. Nor is section 6 limited by section 70a
Many states have exemption statutes to the effect that if the
bankrupt has insurance and the beneficiary named therein is his
wife, or children, or in some statutes simply "another," the policy
shall inure to such beneficiary's separate use and benefit free and
clear from the claims of the creditors of the insured.' The ques-
tion then arises as to what effect the right to change the beneficiary,
reserved to the insured, will have in bankruptcy proceedings.
Since the Supreme Court has held that the power of the insured
to change the beneficiary and obtain the cash surrender value is
an asset which passes to the trustee in bankruptcy,' it is necessary
to rely on the interpretation of the state statute, to ascertain
whether or not it denies the trustee the right to take under the
power reserved in the bankrupt to change the beneficiary, or in
other words, whether a policy containing such a power is within
the terms of the exemption statute.
The federal court in allowing exemptions under a state statute
is governed by the interpretation given by the highest court of the
'Hiscock v. Mertens, (19o7) 205 U. S. 202, 212, 27 S. C. R. 488, 51 L.
Ed. 771.
'Holden v. Straton, (I905) 198 U. S. 202, 213, 25 S. C. R. 656, 49 L.
Ed. ioi8; notes 26 L. R. A. (N.S.) 451 and 41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 123.
'G. S. Minn. 1913, secs. 3465, 3466. A similar provision is found in
some state constitutions. North Carolina, Art. X, sec. 7. See 24 Green
Bag 419.
'Cohen v. Samuels, (1917) 245 U. S. 50, 38 S. C. R. 36, 62 L. Ed. 143;
Cohn v. Malone, (1919) 248 U. S. 450, 39 S. C. R. 141, 63 L. Ed. 352. By
the weight of authority, the beneficiary under a mutual benefit certificate
takes no property, but rather a mere expectancy of benefit under the
contract. Richmond v. Johnson, (i88i) 28 Minn. 447, 1o N. V. 596;
Hoeft v. Supreme Lodge K. of H., (1896) 113 Cal. 91, 45 Pac. 185, 33
L. R. A. 174; 5 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 316. It would seem therefore
that the property remained in the insured. Vance, Insurance, sec. 136.
The Virginia court in Leftwich v. Wells, (1903) 1oi Va. 225, 43 S. E.
364, 99 A. S. R. 865, treated the right to change the beneficiary merely
as a power. The general doctrine of powers is that where the donee has
an absolute power of appointment and the power is not executed, a
court of equity will not treat the subject-matter of the power as assets
for the payment of the donee's creditors, that is, the beneficiary's rights
are protected. Crawford v. Langmaid, (1898) 171 Mass. 309, 5o N. E.
6o6; 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law.i146. See 24 Green Bag 419, 425.
The Supreme Court in Cohen v. Samuels "buttressed its decision by a
reference to clause (3) of sec. 7oa which confers on the trustee all
powers which the bankrupt might have exercised for his own benefit."
27 Yale L. J. 4o3. It is not clear whether the court relied solely on
clause (3) to pass this right to the trustee or not.
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state,'0 but if the statute has not been construed, general rules of
construction are applied. The authorities are divided as to the
rights of the trustee. Those refusing the trustee any benefit con-
tend that if such a construction were placed on exemption statutes
it would practically" nullify them, for the reason that nearly all
modern policies give the insured the right to change the benefic-
iary. ' On the other hand, a minority allow the trustee the cash
surrender value on the ground that the power to change the bene-
ficiary gives the insured such dominion over the policy as to make
it an asset of the estate.' The Supreme Court in Cohn v. Malone"
seems to favor the latter view, though the question is not squarely
presented. Such a result, it is submitted, defeats the purpose of
the exemption statute.
BANKS AND BANKING-DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPECIAL
DEPOSITS AND DEPOSITS FOR A SPECIFIC PURPOSE.-Whatever dis-
tinction may have existed in the past between these two classes of
deposits, since the early case of Farley v. Turner' the courts have
largely disregarded it, perhaps in an effort to avoid hard cases.
The two deposits are in fact distinct, and the distinction is of prac-
tical importance whenever the bank becomes insolvent and is sued
by a depositor claiming a preference over general creditors. "A
"In re Gunzberger, (192o) 268 Fed. 673.
'Richardson v. Woodward, (19oo) 1O4 Fed. 873, 44 C. C. A. 235, 5
A. B. R. 94.
1In re Orear, (C. C. A., 8th Cir., I91n) 189 Fed. 888, i1 C. C. A.
150, 26 A. B. R. 521; In re Pfaffinger, (i9o8) 164 Fed. 526, 21 A. B. R.
255; In re Johnson, (D. C. Minn. i9io) 176 Fed. 591, 24 A. B. R. 277;
In re Pittman, (1921) 275 Fed. 686. The supreme court of Minnesota
in Murphy v. Casey, (1921) 184 N. W. 783, construed its statute, G. S.
Minn. 1913, secs. 3465, 3466, as an exemption statute, and held that the
cash surrender option and the power to change the beneficiary did not
make the interest of the person insured liable to the claims of his cred-
itors. The Bankruptcy Act was not involved.
'In re Herr, (191o) 182 Fed. 716, 25 A. B. R. 142; In re Loveland,
(1912) 192 Fed. 1005, 27 A. B. R. 765, both cases of endowment policies.
In re Young, (D. C. Ohio, 1912) 2o8 Fed. 373, distinguishes between
endowment policies and ordinary policies, holding that the former are
purely speculative investments for the sole benefit of the bankrupt, not
his wife, and therefore pass to the trustee, while the latter are clearly
within the terms of the exemption statute and beyond the reach of the
trustee.
" (1919) 248 U. S. 450, 39 S. C. -R. 141, 63 L. Ed. 352; 28 Yale L. J.603. (1857) 26 L. J. Ch. (N.S.) 710, 5 W. R. 666. For a sounder case
see In re Barned's Banking Co., (1870) 39 L. J. Ch. (N.S.) 635, 22 L. T. R.
853, 18 W. R. 818.
NOTES
special deposit is where the whole contract is that the thing depos-
ited [as a chattel] shall be safely kept, and that identical thing re-
turned to the depositor."' On the other hand, "when money is
deposited to pay a specified check, drawn or to be drawn, or fol
any purpose other than mere safe keeping, or entry on general ac-
count, it is a specific deposit [deposit for a specific pur-
pose] . . ."' The special deposit is merely a bailment, title does
not pass to the bank, and by the application of the ordinary prin-
ciples of bailment, the depositor is entitled to recover his deposit
whether the bank is solvent or insolvent.'
But the matter is not so simple nor are the authorities in har-
mony, in cases of deposits for a specific purpose. Here the cir-
cumstances of the deposit may give rise to an agency relation, a
contract for the benefit of a third person,' or, infrequently, a trust.
The trust theory is often invoked to sustain the depositor's claim
for a preference, but in most, if not all, of these cases there is no
trust relation. The difficulty encountered is the lack of a definite
trust res. Depositors are familiar with the present banking prac-
tise of commingling funds, particularly when the deposit is made
to meet an obligation accruing at some distant point. According-
ly in the majority of cases it is never in the contemplation of the
parties that the funds should be kept separate. The want of a
specific trust res, however, is often ignored by the courts,: a trust
is recognized, and an unwarranted preferential recovery allowed.'
It should be noted that special circumstances may justify the ap-
plication of the trust theory, i. e., where a deposit is made for a
2i M orse, Banks and Banking, 5th Ed., secs. 183, i9o. See also In
re Mutual Building, etc., Bank, (1876) Fed. Cas. No. 9976, 2 Hughes374.
'3 Morse, Banks and Banking, 5th Ed., sec. 185.
'Trover will lie to recover in specie. If the special deposit has
been converted by the bank, i. e., if the fund has been commingled with
other funds, assumpsit will lie. i Morse, Banks and Banking, 5th Ed.,
sec. 205.
'i Ames, Cases on Trusts, 2d Ed., 43, note, reprinted in Scott, Cases
on Trusts, 8o, note.
'Moreland v. Brown, (I898) 86 Fed. 257, 30 C. C. A. 23; Massey v.
Fisher, (1894) 62 Fed. 958; i Harvard L. Rev. 202; 12 Harvard L.
Rev. 221; 16 Harvard L. Rev. 228. Some courts have sidestepped the
difficulty by invoking the equitable maxim that considers as done that
which ought to have been done, declaring that the depositary ought to
have kept the funds separate, and hence that it will be presumed to have
done so. 3 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur., 4 th Ed., note p. 2245. As a general rule
there is no room for the application of this maxim in deposits for a
specific purpose, since a separation of funds is not intended.
'x Morse, Banks and Banking, 5th Ed., secs. i86, 210; Scott, Cases
on Trusts, note p. 69, 70.
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specific purpose and the depositor expresses a clear intent that the
identical fund and to other be used, there is a definite res and since
title to the fund is in the bank,' the essentials of a trust are pres-
ent, and the bank may be charged as trustee and a preference up-
held in case of insolvency. But as previously stated, the deposi-
tor rarely intends that the fund be kept separate, and the class of
cases in which the contrary is true is so limited as not to be im-
portant in modern banking transactions.*
It is argued by some courts that in the case of a deposit for a
specific purpose, the title remains in th depositor and does not pass
to the bank,'0 and hence a recovery is allowed from the bank as
trustee. Obviously the whole legal title cannot be in two persons
simultaneously, and if title does not pass to the bank, it cannot be
in the bank as trustee. If it remains in the depositor, he himself
must be trustee, and his deposit of the trust funds in the bank
gives him no right to a preference over general creditors by reason
of his trusteeship, in case of the subsequent insolvency of the
bank." However it is apparent that in the case of a deposit for
a specific purpose, the statement that title does not pass to the bank
is untrue, in view of the fact that the parties do not intend a sep-
aration of funds and that title passes even when such a separation
is expressly provided for."
In the case of deposits for a specific purpose then, with the ex-
ception of the narrow class of cases before noted, no preference
should be shown the depositor when the bank has become insol-
vent." Such cases are often hard cases, but no harder than if the
'Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 118-120; i9 Harvard L. Rev. 55.
Title to a fund, not in a bag or box and therefore a special deposit,
passes to the bank even though the fund is to be returned or applied in
specie.
'The unsatisfactory decisions of many courts allowing the depositor
an undeserved preference are caused by the application of the trust
theory to all cases of deposits for a specific purpose, whereas the theory
is in fact applicable only to the restricted class of cases indicated.
"Montagu v. Pacific Bank, (0897) 81 Fed. 6o2, 6o8; see also Southerh
Exch. Bank v. Pope, (Ga. 1921) zo8 S. E. 55i; I Morse, Banks and
Banking, 5th Ed., sec. 185; and 7 C. J. p. 632. Some of the authorities
cited on this point by Corpus Juris are not applicable. See for instance
Woodhouse v. Crandall, (19o2) 197 I1. io4, 64 N. E. 292, 58 L. R. A.
385, which is not a case of a deposit for a specific purpose. The same
is true of Anderson v. Pacific Bank, (i896) 112 Cal. 598, 44 Pac. io63,
32 L. R. A. 479, 53 A. S. R. 228.
"l7 C. J. sec. 308, p. 633; 1 Morse, Banks and Banking, 5th Ed., sec.
186.
"Ames, Lectures on Legal History, ii8-i2o; i9 Harvard L. Rev. 55.
"By considering the depositor and the bank as "tenants in common"
NOTES
same depositor had on the same day in the same bank opened a
general account, in which case, in the absence of special circum-
stances, there would be no preference.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS- SERVICE OF PROCESS ON SOLICITING
AGENT AS CONSTITUTING DUE PROCESS or LAw.-The recent
decisions of Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co. v. Payne' and Stephan v.
Union Pac. Ry. Co.' call attention again to the conflict between the
decisions of the Minnesota supreme court and the federal district
court of Minnesota as to the sufficiency of process served on a
soliciting agent of a foreign corporation.' The desirability of
sustaining such service is not here questioned, and it is reasonable
to suppose that the same consideration prompted Start, J., in an
earlier case, to suggest that had a statute authorized service on a
soliciting agent the service might be sustained.! In its initial deci-
sion under the statute amended to conform with the suggestion
mentioned, the court definitely recognized the desirability of sus-
taining service on soliciting agents,' and its conclusion holding the
process sufficient has been commended.' In arriving at this c6n-
clusion, however, it is submitted that the state court maintains a
position inconsistent with its own decisions on what constitutes
due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the fed-
eral constitution and also inconsistent with the constructions it
has placed on decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
of the commingled fund, the depositor possessing an interest in the bank's
funds to the extent of his specific deposit, a preferential recovery might
be sustained where the depositor can trace his deposit to the vaults and
find that at all times there were sufficient funds on hand to meet the
obligation. This suggestion finds no support in the adju'dged cases but
is analogous to the grain-elevator cases in which the depositor's grain is
mingled with grain owned by the warehouseman. It is believed that
this view does less violence to the actual intent of the parties than any
of the other theories upon which preferential recoveries are based.
'(Minn. 1921) 186 N. W. 130.
'(1921) 275 Fed. 709.
'Minn. G. S. 1913, sec. 7735 (3), "provided that any foreign corpora-
tion having an agent in this state for the solicitation of freight and pas-
senger traffic or either thereof over its lines outside of this state, may
be served with summons by delivering a copy thereof to such agent."
'North Wisconsin Cattle Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., (i9o8)
io5 Minn. 198, 2o6, 117 N. W. 391.
'W. J. Armstrong Co. v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., (915) 129
Minn. io4, ixr, 151 N. W. 917, L. R. A. i9i6E 232 and note, Ann. Cas.
i9i6E 335 and note.
'33 Harvard L. Rev. 114, but note that the writer does not recognize
the fact that Minnesota holds that solicitation is not "doing business."
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Whether the process is sufficient is without dispute recognized
to involve fundamentally the question of due process under the
federal constitution, and since it is a federal question the Supreme
Court of the United States is the final arbiter.' The constitutional
requirement of due process is recognized as placing "a limit beyond
which the state cannot go in subjecting foreign corporations to the
jurisdiction of its courts."' This line of demarcation would seem
to have been as clearly established as literal description permits,
for in reference to the service prescribed by a statute in Atkinson
v. United States Operating Co.,' the Minnesota court said,
"But this is not determinative of the question of jurisdiction.
The service of process upon the agent designated by a state
statute in order to confer jurisdiction must constitute due process
of law under the requirements of the fourteenth amendment to
the constitution of the United States. Whether it does or not is
a federal question, ruled by federal decisions. To meet the re-
quirement of due process of law in an action against a foreign
corporation there must not only be service of process upon an
officer or agent within the state, but the corporation must be doing
business in the state."
What constitutes "doing business" in general is not here in
question. Neither is it pertinent to consider the practical objec-
tions to the view that solicitation is not "doing business" for the
state court has frequently held that solicitation does not constitute
"doing business.""
If a foreign corporation is not "doing business" and is thas
beyond the limit imposed by the fourteenth amendment, and if the
statute is not determinative of the question of jurisdiction, on
what ground may the service of process under consideration be
consistently upheld? A prior number of the MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW' enumerates the various theories invoked to justify ser-
'See W. J. Armstrong Co. v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., (I915)
129 Minn. 104, 1o8, 151 N. W. 917, L. R. A. I9i6E 232, Ann. Cas. I9i6E
335; Callaghan v. Union Pac. R. Co., (1921) 148 Minn. 482, 182 N. W.
oo4; Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co. v. Payne, (Minn. i92i) 186 N. W. 130.
'W. J. Armstrong Co. v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., (1915) 129
Minn. 104, 107, 151 N. W. 917, L. R. A. I9i6E 232, Ann. Cas. i9i6E 335.
'(1915) 129 Minn. 232, 233, 152 N. W. 41o, L. R. A. I9i6E 241. Note
that this case was decided after the Armstrong case. The decision is
but a reaffirmation of the position taken by the court before the statutory
amendment in question. See Wold v. J. B. Colt Co., (1907) 1O2 Minn. 386,
389, 114 N. W. 243; North Wisconsin Cattle Co. v. Oregon Short Line
R. Co., (09o8) 1O5 Minn. 198, 205, 117 N. W. 391.
"North Wisconsin Cattle Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., (igo8)
105 Minn. 198, 207, 117 N. W. 391; see Archer-Daniels Linseed Co. v.
Blue Ridge Despatch, (1911) 113 Minn. 367, 372, 129 N. W. 765.12I MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 192.
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vice on foreign legal entities. The difficulties are more apparent
when considered in the light of the early doctrine that a corpora-
tion cannot be found outside of the state of its incorporation." In
the Armstrong Case the court expressly recognizes a departure
from this doctrine" and although the exact theory there adopted to
sustain jurisdiction is not clearly outlined, a later decision under
the same statute definitely states that jurisdiction is founded on
the "presence" of the corporate entity." It is to be noted that Start
J., did not suggest that a statute in the present form would be of
assistance under the application of this latter doctrine but specified
the "consent" doctrine.' The court in the Armstrong case refuses
to be content with placing its decision on such "narrow ground."
The consent doctrine has been severely criticized.*'
It has been contended that what constitutes this "presence"
under the fourteenth amendment is a broader question than what
constitutes "doing business"" and thus, it may be argued, service
on a foreign corporation not "doing business" would still be per-
missible and would constitute due process so long as the corpora-
tion was "present." In sustaining process under the statutory
amendment in question, the Minnesota court has made statements
which might be construed as establishing such a distinction.!' It
'Sullivan v. La Crosse & Minnesota Packet Co., (1865) io Minn.
386 (3o8) ; Tolerton & Stetson Co. v. Barck, (Igoi) 84 Minn. 497, 88 N.
W. ig. Note that the doctrine here invoked to sustain jurisdiction rests
on the right of the state to impose conditions precedent to the right
of a foreign corporation to do business therein, a doctrine since aban-
doned. For a criticism of this doctrine see.I MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 192,
32 Harvard L. Rev. 871, 878.
"W. J. Armstrong Co. v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., (1915) 129
Minn. io4, 107, 15x N. W. 917, L. R. A. 1916E 232, Ann. Cas. 1916E 335.1Nienhauser v. Robertson Paper Co., (1920) 146 Minn. 244, 178 N.
W. 504.
"By directing its agents to enter a foreign state the corporation
impliedly consents to service of process in manner prescribed by the law
of that state. North Wisconsin Cattle Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.,
(I98) xo5 Minn. 198, 2o6, 117 N. W. 391.16I MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 192; 30 Harvard L. Rev. 676, 689-695;
32 Harvard L. Rev. 871, 881.
1 3o Harvard L. Rev. 676, 695, but the citations given by the writer
in support of the theory advanced show only a distinction as to %vhat
constitutes "doing business" for purposes of taxation and the imposition
of license fees, etc., as contrasted with what constitutes "doing business!'
for purposes of serving process, and not a distinction between what
constitutes "doing business" and what constitutes "presence" for the
purpose of serving process. See 32 Harvard L. Rev. 871, 881, which
approves the doctrine of jurisdiction founded on "presence" but distinctly
uses the term "doing business" as a designation of that "presence."
'Instead of defining the limit beyond which states cannot go in sub-
jecting foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of their courts, the re-
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would seem, however, that prior decisions preclude the taking of
this position in that the court has consistently used the termin-
ology "doing business" to designate that limit which is now de-
scribed as "presence." Does the desirability of the result attained
warrant the severe strain on the former decisions and the con-
structions there placed on decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States on a federal question?
RECENT CASES.
ADMIRALTY-HYDROEROPLANE WHILE ON WATER IS A "VESSEL" WITH-
in ADMIRALTY JURISDICTIox.-Claimant was employed in the care and man-
agement of a hydroaeroplane which was moored in navigable waters at
Brooklyn. To save the plane, which had begun to drag anchor and drift
toward the beach, from being wrecked, claimant waded into the water and
was injured by the propeller. The State Industrial Commission awarded
compensation to the claimant. Held, that, while on the water, the plane
was within admiralty jurisdiction, and therefore the Commission had no
jurisdiction. Reinhart v. Newport Flying Service Corporation, (N. Y.
1921) 133 N. E. 371.
Thus this new craft which, according to Cardozo, J., writing the
illuminating opinion, "would have pnystified the lord- high admiral in the
days when he was competing for jurisdiction with Coke and the courts of
commqn law," has, as to its water activities at least, found its legal
pigeon-hole, although while in the air it is not the subject of admiralty.
Crawford Bros., No. 2, (914) 215 Fed. 269.
BANKRUPTCY-BUSINEss TRUSTS-APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL BANK-
RUPTCY AcT.-On motion to dismiss an involuntary petition in bankruptcy
on the ground that a business or Massachusetts trust did not come within
sections 4 and 5 of the federal Bankruptcy Act (Comp. Stat. I918, secs.
quirement "doing business" has been said to be but an incident in the
determination of whether there is a proper agent as designated by the
statute, and at least in these instances has lost its fundamental function
of determining whether under the federal constitution the corporation
is subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state. W. J. Arm-
strong Co. v. New York C. and H. R. R. Co., (1915) 129 Minn. io4, IIO,
151 N. XV. 917, L. R. A. i916E 232, Ann. Cas. 1916E 335; see Rishmiller
v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., (19x6) 134 Minn. 261, 265, i59 N. W.
272, aff'd., 159 N. W. 947, where it is stated that a foreign corporation
"is present in the state when it has an agent there transacting its busi-
ness, whatever the character of the business may be," the court conclud-
ing that "Neither the nature of the business nor the volume of the busi-
ness transacted is important so long as the corporation can fairly be said
to be doing business in the state." Evidently the Minnesota Court is
resolved to retain the jurisdiction until squarely overruled by the federal
Supreme Court.
